On Unix, instead of getting random data from `/dev/urandom`, it will get
it from the `rand` platform agnostic crate instead.
OsRng.fill_bytes on unix will make a syscall to getrandom(2) if
available, otherwise it will read from `dev/urandom` after a succesful
poll to `dev/random`. Regardless of which way a random data is
retrieved, if the entropy pool is not intialized, `fill_bytes` will
block until it is intialized. This shouldn't be a problem because it is
a one time cost.
This CL will also upstream the Windows implementation of the rng device.
BUG=b:213149162
TEST=built and presubmits
Change-Id: Ic017f11795f8006e0bf2a04eb0478b3a3d336507
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/platform/crosvm/+/3657812
Reviewed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Tested-by: kokoro <noreply+kokoro@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Richard Zhang <rizhang@google.com>
The libminijail version in AOSP complains when there are multiple entries for
the same system call, which was the case for virtio-fs's policy.
BUG=b/185811304
Change-Id: I389c07c86e7d79f16e4f47a893abad598033352a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/platform/crosvm/+/2837307
Commit-Queue: Jorge Moreira Broche <jemoreira@google.com>
Tested-by: Jorge Moreira Broche <jemoreira@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dylan Reid <dgreid@chromium.org>
Minijail's policy compiler complains when there's multiple
unconditional rules for a syscall. In most cases the rules
are redundant to common_device.policy.
BUG=None
TEST=Ran compile_seccomp_policy.py until it stopped
complaining.
Change-Id: Ic43d1fd13f9c012641d71e526942229eb8b08ed4
Signed-off-by: Matt Delco <delco@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/platform/crosvm/+/2034024
Tested-by: kokoro <noreply+kokoro@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dylan Reid <dgreid@chromium.org>
These policies are not for aarch64 but use the 32-bit system calls.
We call it aarch64 support because that's what we're targetting for
the guest kernel, but it doesn't really make any sense to call the
seccomp policies aarch64 when we're building a 32-bit binary.
We can add real aarch64 seccomp policies when we start building a
aarch64 crosvm binary.
BUG=chromium:866197
TEST=emerge-kevin crosvm, run vm_CrosVmStart
CQ-DEPEND=CL:1145903
Change-Id: I7c5e70fbc127e4209ed392cfcf10ea36a6dd4b2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1145909
Commit-Ready: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zach Reizner <zachr@chromium.org>
It looks like on ARM we use the real gettimeofday system call when
we're outputting error messages, so we need to whitelist this to avoid
crashing instead of seeing the error messages.
BUG=chromium:843807
TEST=run vm_CrosVmStart and make sure there are no crashes for crosvm
Change-Id: I9f47da8dabe31f0677bcaa1d431e56545e20c9c9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1081390
Commit-Ready: ChromeOS CL Exonerator Bot <chromiumos-cl-exonerator@appspot.gserviceaccount.com>
Tested-by: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>
- removes old ARMv7a (32-bit) bindings as we're only supporting aarch64
guests right now
- switches both ARMv7 and aarch64 builds to use aarch64 kvm bindings
- adds support for ARMv8 Linux guest with dynamic flattened-device-tree
CQ-DEPEND=990894
BUG=chromium:797868
TEST=./build_test passes on all architectures
TEST=crosvm runs on caroline
TEST=crosvm runs on kevin built with USE="kvm_host"
Change-Id: I7fc4fc4017ed87fd23a1bc50e3ebb05377040006
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/969987
Commit-Ready: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zach Reizner <zachr@chromium.org>
