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Dennis Kempin aae0141680 dev_container: Upgrade to debian bookworm 
Debian bullseye is becoming old and we require a couple of newer
dependencies. gLinux is also tracking bookworm, so we are staying
close to our usual development environment.

Since the official rust images do not have a bookworm version,
we switch to the official debian image and add a rustup install
to ./tools/install-deps.

The new glibc version uses clone3 in multiple devices, adding
this new syscall to our policy to pass integration tests.

Drive-by change: Upgrading rust-toolchain from 1.62.0 to 1.62.1

BUG=b:243081643
TEST=CQ

Change-Id: I8af721ed4a83df61163d67001b777166abe8abfa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/crosvm/crosvm/+/3892621
Commit-Queue: Dennis Kempin <denniskempin@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
2022-09-14 22:32:36 +00:00
..
aarch64 dev_container: Upgrade to debian bookworm 2022-09-14 22:32:36 +00:00
arm dev_container: Upgrade to debian bookworm 2022-09-14 22:32:36 +00:00
x86_64 dev_container: Upgrade to debian bookworm 2022-09-14 22:32:36 +00:00
README.md seccomp: define naming rules for policy files 2022-06-17 04:35:09 +00:00

README.md

Policy files for crosvm

This folder holds the seccomp policies for crosvm devices, organized by architecture.

Each crosvm device can run within its owned jailed process. A jailed process is only able to perform the system calls specified in the seccomp policy file the jail has been created with, which improves security as a rogue process cannot perform any system call it wants.

Each device can run from different contexts, which require a different set of authorized system calls. This file explains how the policy files are named in order to allow these various scenario.

Naming conventions

Since Minijail only allows for one level of policy inclusion, we need to be a little bit creative in order to minimize policy duplication.

  • common_device.policy contains a set of syscalls that are common to all devices, and is never loaded directly - only included from other policy files.
  • foo.policy contains the set of syscalls that device foo is susceptible to use, regardless of the underlying virtio transport. This policy is also never loaded directly.
  • foo_device.policy is the policy that is loaded when device foo is used as an in-VMM (i.e. regular virtio) device. It will generally simply include common_device.policy as well as foo.policy.

When using vhost-user, the virtio protocol needs to be sent over a different medium, e.g. a Unix socket. Supporting this transport requires some extra system calls after the device is jailed, and thus dedicated policies:

  • vhost_user.policy contains the set of syscalls required by the regular (i.e. socket-based) vhost-user listener. It is never loaded directly.
  • vvu.policy contains the set of syscalls required by the VFIO-based vhost-user (aka Virtio-Vhost-User) listener. It is also never loaded directly.
  • foo_device_vhost_user.policy is the policy that is loaded when device foo is used as a regular vhost-user device. It will generally include common_device.policy, vhost_user.policy and foo.policy.
  • foo_device_vvu.policy is the policy that is loaded when device foo is used as a VVU device. It will generally include common_device.policy, vvu.policy and foo.policy.